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MSP Security

ScreenConnect Attacks on MSPs: The SCKit Cleanup and CVE-2026-84869 Patch Plan

Scopable Team8 min read
ScreenConnect Attacks on MSPs: The SCKit Cleanup and CVE-2026-84869 Patch Plan

On November 11, attackers used MSPs' own cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels to push Run Commands that installed a second, rogue ScreenConnect client on managed endpoints. Huntress counted at least 288 endpoints across 48 organizations in that first wave, all hit within about 90 minutes. A second wave on November 13 reached 205 hosts across 41 organizations.

Then on November 16, Huntress published a second report on a separate campaign that skips the panel and goes after the technician. Between October 20 and November 16, attackers sent 688,000 "run file" requests to 42 MSP ScreenConnect servers, waiting for a tech to join a session from a host client that still has CVE-2026-84869. On November 12, one technician workstation went from that join to full compromise in about 9 seconds.

Quick answer: this week, disable the five third-party extensions Connectwise named, update every technician's ScreenConnect host client to 26.6.5 or later, pull Run Command and Toolbox history on every instance, and stop opening ScreenConnect sessions to machines you suspect. If anything turns up, rotate every credential those technician workstations can reach. Most of this is your own cleanup, so don't bill clients for it.

What happened on November 11

The attackers didn't need a new ScreenConnect bug for the first wave. They used the panel's own Run Command feature, the same one your techs use to push a script, to download and silently install a ScreenConnect client that reports to a server they control. That client survives after the MSP's session ends. Sophos saw the same pattern: curl pulls an installer into the Windows Temp folder, then msiexec installs it quietly.

Connectwise published an advisory the same night. Per BleepingComputer's report of that advisory, it disabled five third-party extensions across about 400 partner environments as a precaution: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, and RMM+ Password Link. Cloud instances got that automatically. On-premises partners have to disable them by hand. Connectwise also said the presence of one of these extensions doesn't by itself mean the environment was compromised.

Huntress says the activity "seems to be related" to RMM+. Versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted a blank access key when nobody had set one, and RMM+ bypasses ScreenConnect's user accounts, roles, and MFA. Put those together and an attacker can run commands with no sign-in to show for it. So a clean sign-in log proves nothing here. Run Command history is the record that matters.

Two more details make this worse than one bad week. Huntress found the attackers tag each compromised MSP with a sequential number, and the tags it observed start partway through the sequence, so earlier victims are likely. BleepingComputer also found a related script on VirusTotal from July 25, 2026.

Turn the sweep into a scoped project

Scopable pulls the client environment into the scope, so every machine that needs a check, a cleanup, or a new remote access agent becomes a line with labor on a quote the client approves. Start for free and run it on your first client today.

The technician is the target now

The malware behind the first wave is a 16-script toolkit researchers call SCKit, per BleepingComputer's follow-up. One piece, RelayTrap, replaces the ScreenConnect Guest process on an infected endpoint and waits for a technician to connect. When one does, it tries to push a file back to the tech's machine using CVE-2026-84869. If that works, other pieces steal the tech's ScreenConnect session cookies and use their permissions to push commands through Shared Toolbox to other clients.

The good news: Huntress and Blackpoint Cyber haven't seen that spread succeed. Blackpoint reproduced the exploit against a current client and the existing fix blocked it.

The bad news is in the word "current." CVE-2026-84869 is a CVSS 9.9 flaw that Connectwise disclosed on September 8, 2026, fixed in 26.6.5, and CISA added to the KEV catalog on September 11. The vulnerable code runs on the technician's host client, so patching the server doesn't close it. Huntress's November 16 report found techs joining sessions from 22.x, 24.2, and 25.8 host clients weeks after the fix shipped.

If your patch policy treats ScreenConnect as a server you update every quarter, it's missing the part that got people owned. Every tech laptop, every jump box, and every contractor machine with the host client installed is in scope.

What to do this week

In order:

  1. Disable the five extensions. On-premises instances need it done by hand. Don't reinstall them until Connectwise says otherwise.
  2. Update every host client to 26.6.5 or later. If a tech can't update today, Huntress recommends removing the TransferFiles permission from roles and session groups until they do.
  3. Pull Run Command and Toolbox history on every instance, even if nothing alerted. You're looking for client installs you didn't push, a second ScreenConnect client on any endpoint, a scheduled task named TrapWatch, and a C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap folder.
  4. Check the server for guest file pushes. Huntress's November 16 report covers the Session.db queries and the blank-named guest sessions that keep requesting update batch files. Delete those sessions and check again, because they come back.
  5. Stop connecting to suspect machines over ScreenConnect. Use your EDR, WinRM, or another out-of-band tool. Treat any tech workstation that already joined a session on a suspect machine as exposed.
  6. If you find anything, assume the tech's reach is gone. Isolate the machine, remove the rogue client and its persistence, then rotate what that workstation can touch: RMM, PSA, ScreenConnect, the password vault, and client admin accounts. SCKit can steal session tokens, so revoke browser and identity provider sessions too. A password reset alone leaves those tokens working.
  7. Shrink the front door. Restrict who can join as a guest, and limit the web interface and installer downloads by IP or VPN.

Huntress, Sophos, and the Hacker News writeup list the indicators, including domains, file names, and rogue instance IDs. Load them into your EDR and SIEM rather than copying them into a ticket.

The extension list nobody keeps

Ask most MSPs which agents run on a client endpoint and you'll get an answer in a minute. Ask which extensions are installed on their own ScreenConnect, RMM, and PSA instances, who installed each one, and how each one authenticates, and you'll get a long pause.

That pause is how this happened. An extension with its own API and a "leave the key blank" mode is a second front door with no MFA. It sits outside the access reviews you run on user accounts.

Add the extensions to the review. For each remote access, RMM, and PSA instance, list every extension with its owner, why you have it, and how it authenticates. Anything nobody can explain gets removed. The MSP user access review template already has the cadence and sign-off for people, and the vendor risk assessment template has the questions to ask the vendor behind each extension.

Who pays for this

If the attacker came in through your panel, the cleanup is yours. Sending a client an invoice to remove malware that arrived through your remote access tool is a fast way to lose the client. Read your MSA's incident terms before anyone else does, and if you carry cyber insurance, read its notice clause today.

Some of this is legitimately billable, though. Clients on co-managed IT often run their own ScreenConnect instance, and their techs have host clients too. That work is a project, and so is any client who decides after this week that they want a different remote access tool:

LineWhat it covers
Host client update, per technician seatBring every ScreenConnect host client in the client's own instance to 26.6.5 or later.
Extension and permission reviewRemove unneeded extensions, set access keys, restrict guest joins and file transfer rights.
Endpoint sweep, per machineCheck every endpoint for remote access software nobody approved, using a tool outside ScreenConnect.
Remote access migrationMove to a different tool if the client asks for it, including agent rollout and tech training.

If the client is weighing tools, the ScreenConnect vs Splashtop comparison covers cost and licensing. Build the sweep line from the actual endpoint count, not a guess. Scopable's assessment and scoping software pulls the client environment into the scope, so the machine list and the project lines come from the same data.

What to tell clients this week

Most clients won't read about this until someone forwards them a headline. Get there first, and keep it short. If your sweep came back clean:

Last week attackers went after IT providers that use ScreenConnect, a remote support tool we use. We've applied the vendor's fixes and checked every machine we manage for you for unauthorized remote access software. We found none. There's nothing you need to do, and if that changes you'll hear from us first.

If it didn't come back clean, that's a different conversation with different rules. The vendor breach response guide covers the client calls, and the MSP incident response plan template covers the order of operations. Do the calls before the client finds out from someone else.

Frequently Asked Questions

What happened in the November 2026 ScreenConnect attacks on MSPs?

On November 11, 2026, attackers used MSPs' cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels to run commands that installed a rogue ScreenConnect client on managed endpoints. Huntress counted at least 288 endpoints across 48 organizations in the first wave and 205 hosts across 41 organizations in a second wave on November 13. Connectwise disabled five third-party extensions (Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, and RMM+ Password Link) across about 400 partner environments, and Huntress links the activity to RMM+ versions that accepted a blank access key.

Which ScreenConnect version fixes CVE-2026-84869?

ScreenConnect 26.6.5, released September 8, 2026. The flaw is in the technician's host client, which runs a file a guest pushes during a session without asking, so updating the server alone doesn't fix it. Update every host client to 26.6.5 or later, and remove the TransferFiles permission from roles and session groups for any tech who can't update yet. CISA added CVE-2026-84869 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on September 11, 2026.

Can an MSP bill clients for the ScreenConnect attack cleanup?

Not when the attacker came in through the MSP's own ScreenConnect panel. That cleanup is the MSP's cost, and the MSA's incident terms and any cyber insurance notice clause matter more than an invoice. Work on a client's own ScreenConnect instance is billable as a project: updating its technician host clients, reviewing its extensions and permissions, sweeping endpoints for unapproved remote access software, and migrating to another remote access tool if the client asks.

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Where this fits in Scopable

This article feeds the assessment and scoping cluster: collect findings, choose recommendations, and turn the real work into scope.

See assessment and scoping